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1. Introduction 
In recent years, political theorists have devoted increasing attention to questions of 
methodology. The debate on so-called “ideal vs non-ideal theory” is at the heart of 
this methodological turn, and prominently features controversies about international 
political morality. Specifically, some of the most ambitious views in international 
political theory are routinely criticized for being too “ideal” or “utopian.” Targets of 
these criticisms include: cosmopolitan theories defending global distributive equality, 
theories of global democracy, and so-called “revisionist” just-war theory.  
 My aim in this chapter is to evaluate whether and, if so, under what 
conditions, the critique of excessive idealism succeeds. I argue that success is rare. I 
proceed as follows. In Section 2, I clarify terminology and distinguish between two 
reasons why a theory may be labelled “ideal”: either because it contains idealizations 
or because it is insensitive to feasibility constraints. In Section 3, I address objections 
raised against international political theories that contain idealizations. I show that 
whether the presence of idealizations invalidates a given theory depends on the role 
those idealizations play within the theory as a whole. In Section 4, I address 
objections raised against theories that (allegedly) fail to take sufficient account of 
feasibility constraints. I argue that those objections only threaten normative theories 
that claim to deliver practically efficacious guidance. Purely evaluative theories, and 
normative theories that do not aspire to practical efficacy, are unaffected by this 
“feasibility” critique. I thus conclude, in Section 5, that there is nothing wrong with 
ideal theorizing as such, but only with certain misuses of it. Throughout, I illustrate 
these broader methodological points—which I have partly defended elsewhere1—by 
reference to examples drawn from some of the most prominent areas of international 
political theory: global justice, global democratic theory, and just-war theory. 
 
2. What Is an Ideal Theory? 
One often hears political theorists refer to “ideal” and “nonideal” theory. Yet what the 
labels “ideal” and “non-ideal” stand for is far from clear (for overviews, see 
Stemplowska 2008; Valentini 2012; Stemplowska and Swift 2012). What is more, the 
very notion of “a theory” is ubiquitously, yet loosely, invoked.  
 First, by “a theory” I mean a set of propositions, entailed by principles, that 
play a given functional role in an agent’s understanding of reality (List and Valentini 
2016). Depending on the relevant functional role, we can distinguish between positive 
and normative/evaluative theories. A theory is normative when its propositions 
include deontic operators (such as “ought,” “must,” “may”), and it is evaluative when 
its propositions include evaluative predicates (such as “good,” “bad,” “just,” 
                                                
∗ I am grateful to Chris Brown, Robyn Eckersley, Seth Lazar, Pietro Maffettone and David Wiens for 
their helpful comments.  
1 This chapter offers an application of ideas developed in Valentini (2009; 2016) and in List and 
Valentini (2016) to the domain of international political theory in particular. 
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“unjust”). Otherwise, it is positive. Biological and physical theories—e.g., Darwin’s 
theory of evolution or Einstein’s theory of relativity—are positive. Theories of 
international justice and of the just war, by contrast, belong to the normative or 
evaluative domain.  
 In this contribution, I focus on normative and/or evaluative theories that may 
be described as “ideal.” The distinction between ideal and nonideal theory was first 
introduced by John Rawls (1999a, 8, 215; cf. Simmons 2010). An ideal theory, 
according to Rawls’s definition, is a theory designed assuming “full compliance”—
i.e., all agents act as they ought to—and “favourable conditions”—i.e., circumstances 
are such that individuals’ basic rights and needs can be met (Rawls 1999a, 475–76). A 
non-ideal theory, by contrast, is a theory characterized by partial compliance, and/or 
the lack of favourable conditions. That said, in the recent literature, the notion of ideal 
theory has taken on several, and rather broader, understandings. Two of them are 
particularly prominent, which I discuss below. 
On one understanding, normative and/or evaluative theories are “ideal” to the 
extent that they involve idealizations. Idealizations, in Onora O’Neill’s (1996, 41) 
well-known characterization, are falsities introduced for theoretical purposes. Full 
compliance and favourable conditions are just two examples of idealization: it is 
plainly false that, in our world, everyone complies with the demands of justice, and 
that favourable conditions always obtain. Other idealizations include statements such 
as: “there is no disagreement about justice across different societies”; “soldiers in war 
face no uncertainty”; “society is a closed system”; “individuals are always 
altruistically motivated,” and so forth.  
 A second understanding of ideal theory has developed in connection with 
debates about so-called feasibility constraints (e.g., Räikkä 1998; Gilabert and 
Lawford-Smith 2012; Lawford-Smith 2013; Wiens 2015b). From this perspective, the 
more insensitive to feasibility constraints a theory is, the greater its level of idealism. 
Feasibility constraints are those physical, biological, political, psychological, and 
economic facts that make the prescriptions of a normative theory hard, if not 
impossible, to realize. Theories of international political morality that prescribe 
considerable global redistribution, demand global democratic participation, or make 
the permissibility of killing in war dependent on individuals’ moral liability are often 
regarded as “ideal” in this sense—since their prescriptions appear to be either 
impossible or at any rate extremely hard to fulfil.  
For the sake of completeness, I should mention that there is also a third 
understanding of ideal theory in the current literature. This is ideal theory understood 
as offering an end-point towards which we should aspire. This understanding of ideal 
theory is contrasted with transitional theories of justice, detailing how to make 
progress justice-wise, without necessarily achieving the ideal (Sen 2009; Wiens 
2015a; 2012). Due to space constraints, I set this third understanding aside in the 
present chapter, and focus on the previous two. 
 It has become quite common to object to (international) political theories by 
virtue of their being ideal in either of the two senses I focus on—which involve 
idealization and insensitivity to feasibility constraints, respectively. Behind these 
critiques stands the following general concern. A key aim of (international) political 
theory is to help us address pressing normative questions that arise in today’s 
international realm: wars, refugee crises, global poverty, and much else. Ideal 
theories, however, are doomed to fail in this respect. At best, they are useless; at 
worst, their application to current (international) affairs will deliver bad outcomes 
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(see, e.g., Mills 2005; Farrelly 2007; McCarthy 2004; Sen 2009; Wiens 2015a; Miller 
2013; cf. Valentini 2009).2 
 In what follows, I examine the validity of this critique in relation to (i) theories 
of international political morality that contain idealizations and (ii) theories that 
disregard feasibility constraints.  
 
3. Responding to the Charge of Idealization  
Several normative/evaluative theories of international politics contain idealizations. 
Here I offer three prominent examples. 
 
• Cosmopolitan theories of global distributive justice that recommend applying 
the outcome of Rawls’s original-position thought experiment to the world at 
large (see, e.g., Beitz 1999; Pogge 1989). To the extent that Rawls’s thought-
experiment contains idealizations (not only about full compliance and 
favourable conditions, but also in the characterizations of the parties behind 
the veil of ignorance), those idealizations are carried forward in cosmopolitan 
theories that globalize its conclusions. 
• Rawls’s statist theory of international justice, outlined in The Law of Peoples, 
contains several idealizations, including its assumption that societies are 
relatively independent units, distinguished into five categories: liberal, decent, 
burdened, outlaws states and benevolent absolutisms (Rawls 1999b). The 
theory, in other words, assumes away much of the complexity of 
contemporary international politics. 
• Revisionist theories of the just war, which are designed often assuming away 
some of the most physically and psychologically debilitating circumstances of 
war (see, e.g., McMahan 2009; Fabre 2012; Frowe 2014).  
 
Does the fact that these theories contain idealizations suffice to put their tenability 
into question? Critics of ideal theory as idealized theory would answer in the 
affirmative. This unconditional affirmative answer is unwarranted. Whether the 
presence of idealizations affects the plausibility of a normative theory, I suggest, 
depends on the level at which the idealizations are introduced.    
 As Christian List and I have argued elsewhere, one should distinguish between 
three levels at which idealizations may be encountered in the construction of a 
normative theory. First, the idealizations might be contained in the theory itself, 
namely in the body of propositions entailed by its principles. Second, the idealizations 
might be contained in the conditions of applicability of the theory, namely in the set 
of circumstances and agents to which the theory is meant to apply. Third, 
idealizations may be contained in the arguments or evidence offered in support of a 
given theory (List and Valentini 2016). Which kinds of idealizations are dangerous? 
 While the presence of idealizations within the theory itself is problematic, this 
is for reasons other than those cited by critics of idealization. To say that a theory 
contains idealizations is to say that some of its propositions are false in relation to 
their subject matter. If a theory of international political morality is idealized in this 
first sense, all this means is that its prescriptions are incorrect. For instance, if the 
theory prescribes global socio-economic redistribution, but this is not in fact what 
                                                
2 I am here setting aside the so-called “realist” critique of Rawls-inspired political theory. For 
discussion, see Duncan Bell’s contribution to this volume. 
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global justice requires, then the theory is “idealized”: it contains a false statement 
about international justice.  
 What critics of idealized theorising typically have in mind are idealizations 
that feature at the level either of the arguments offered in support of a normative 
theory or of the conditions of applicability of the theory, which I discuss in turn. An 
example of the former is offered by cosmopolitan theories of justice: both (i) 
“relational” theories that globalize the outcome of Rawls’s original-position on the 
ground that there exists a “global basic structure of society” (e.g., Beitz 1999; Pogge 
1989) and (ii) “non-relational” theories that advocate global equality independently of 
the existence of a global basic structure or particular global relationships (e.g., Caney 
2005; for the labels “relational” and “non-relational,” see Sangiovanni 2007).  
 As mentioned earlier, “globalizing” Rawls’s original position involves 
importing all of the idealizations that characterize it. These include not only the 
assumptions of full compliance and favourable conditions, but also a given 
description of the “contractors” who are to choose the relevant principles of justice. 
Famously, they are prevented from knowing facts about themselves—including their 
talents, abilities, and social class—by being placed under a “veil of ignorance.” These 
assumptions are clearly counter-factual: they involve falsities about the world in 
which we live. But does the fact that they figure in the argument supporting Rawls’s 
theory—i.e., the fact that Rawls’s principles would be chosen in the original 
position—necessarily imply that the theory itself is somehow undermined? It is far 
from clear why it should (List and Valentini 2016; cf. Lawford-Smith 2010). 
The original position is meant to model circumstances of fairness, such that its 
output may also be regarded as fair. One may of course object to the original position 
on the grounds that its modelling of fairness is unconvincing. But this would be a 
substantive objection, not a methodological one having to do with idealization. 
Consider the following analogy. When considering whether the grade we have given a 
student whose identity we know is fair, we may want to ask whether we would have 
given the same grade had we not known the student’s identity. To be sure, this is a 
counterfactual claim, yet its counterfactual nature, per se, does not appear to 
invalidate its heuristic value. Perhaps, we can think of a better counterfactual, say one 
in which not only the identity of the paper’s author is concealed, but also where the 
handwriting of the author is easier to read. Poor handwriting may in fact negatively 
influence examiners. Still, the use of idealizations in the evidence/arguments used in 
support of a theory is not per se problematic.  
 Similar conclusions may be drawn with respect to even starker instances of 
uses of idealizations in the “evidence” supporting a theory. Consider the 
counterfactuals marshalled by “non-relational cosmopolitans” in support of the view 
that justice demands equality between individuals independently of whether they 
share a Rawlsian “basic structure,” or other kinds of special relationships. For 
example, we may be invited to imagine individuals in completely separate plots of 
land, who do not know each other, and who are differently off: one has plenty, the 
other very little, and neither deserves his fortune or misfortune. We are then asked 
whether this deeply unequal distribution of resource strikes us as unjust. A positive 
answer to this question is evidence in support of non-relational cosmopolitanism. To 
be sure, the far-fetched scenario involving two individuals is far from an accurate 
description of the world today. Yet its point is not to offer such a description, but only 
to prove that our convictions about egalitarian justice do not depend on the presence 
of a basic structure or special relationships. And to do so, precisely those relationships 
have to be (counter-factually) assumed away. This is a familiar technique in causal 
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reasoning. To establish that our headache does not depend on chocolate consumption, 
we stop eating chocolate and see whether the headache persists. Similarly, to prove 
that (our thinking about) justice does not depend on special relationships, we assume 
them away, and test whether our intuitions persist in such counterfactual—
relationship-free—scenarios. 
 The foregoing discussion has shown that the use of idealizations in the 
arguments or evidence offered in support of a normative theory is not per se a source 
of concern. Resort to idealization as such does not make an argument a bad one. 
Though of course many arguments can contain idealizations and also be weak or 
unsuccessful, for reasons that are independent of the mere fact that they feature those 
idealizations. 
 Let me finally turn to idealization at the level of the conditions of application 
of a normative theory. By “conditions of application,” I mean the circumstances under 
which its prescriptions hold. For example, consider the conditional prescription: “One 
ought to abide by the law if most of one’s fellow citizens comply with it.” The duty to 
abide by the law, here, applies in circumstances of near full compliance. But the 
above conditional prescription tells us nothing about what we should do when very 
few comply with the law.  
 Several theories of international political morality are characterized by the 
presence of idealizations at the level of their conditions of application. Rawls’s “law 
of peoples” and contemporary revisionist theories of the just war are two prominent 
examples. Rawls’s principles of international justice are designed assuming a world 
populated by societies that are fairly self-contained, and independent of each other. 
This is also a world in which societies can be easily classified in the following 
mutually exclusive categories: well-ordered peoples, burdened/less-developed 
societies, and rogue regimes. In a world populated by these types of societies, Rawls’s 
principles apply.  
 It is of course almost superfluous to say that today’s world is far from the 
simplified one Rawls envisages. Poor societies can also be rogue regimes. Liberal 
societies are often implicated in the institutional deficits of developing countries 
(Shue 2002). Furthermore, societies are not relatively independent, but deeply 
interconnected through the global economy (Pogge 2001). What this means is that the 
prescriptions contained Rawls’s eight principles may well not apply to, or be 
appropriate for, the world in which we live. Strictly speaking, they are silent about it. 
If we want the theory to be able to guide our action in real-world circumstances, this 
form of idealization is of course problematic. That is, conditional on the aim of the 
theory being real-world action-guidance, idealizations in its domain of application 
render the theory highly likely to be unsuccessful: we have very little reason to 
believe that principles that are appropriate for Rawls’s simplified world also work for 
ours. Though, if the aim of the theory is not to guide action in real-world 
circumstances, but simply to outline a number of conditional prescriptions taking the 
form “In such and such circumstances, one ought to perform such and such actions,” 
then the presence of idealizations in the theory’s conditions of application is not per 
se problematic.  
 In the case of Rawls’s theory of international justice, it seems interpretively 
plausible to suggest that The Law of Peoples is indeed meant to apply to existing 
circumstances—indeed, it is meant to guide the foreign policy of liberal societies. To 
that extent, the presence of idealizations in its conditions of application justifiably 
raises concerns. The charge of problematic idealization is warranted in this case 
(Valentini 2009). 
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 Let me now turn to just-war theory. Key tenets of just war theory—especially 
of jus in bello, as famously discussed by Michael Walzer (1977)—are the moral 
equality of combatants and non-combatant immunity. The former corresponds to the 
idea that combatants enjoy the same moral status independently of whether they are 
fighting on the “just side”; the latter to the idea that deliberately targeting non-
combatants is impermissible. Recently, the Walzerian—“orthodox”—paradigm has 
been challenged by so-called “revisionist” just-war theorists, who wish to tie the 
permissions and prohibitions applying to individuals in war to their moral liability 
(see, e.g., McMahan 2009; Fabre 2012; Frowe 2014). The revisionist picture of the 
just war—and of jus in bello specifically—seeks to make just war principles more 
“continuous” with ordinary peacetime morality and the ethics of self-defence. On 
revisionist views, the status of combatants in war should depend on whether they are 
responsible for unjust threats. Furthermore, for revisionists, some noncombatants may 
also be legitimate targets, to the extent that they share responsibility for serious 
enough wrongdoing.  
 Partly due to their focus on individual defensive killing, revisionist just-war 
theorists often develop their prescriptions against the background of highly stylized 
scenarios, some of which involve far-fetched self-defence situations—e.g., ray-guns 
and sizeable individuals falling down wells or bridges (e.g., Frowe 2014, 22; 
McMahan 2009, 172). The psychological duress, collectivist dimension, and 
uncertainty that characterize war are not given much attention.  
Although, as discussed earlier, the use of stylized scenarios serves useful 
theoretical purposes, it also casts doubt on whether the prescriptions arrived at by 
appeal to them are appropriate for their intended context of application: war (Shue 
2010). Some contemporary revisionist just-war theory, then, might also be susceptible 
to the charge of idealization, at least to the extent that its prescriptions are (i) meant to 
apply to war as we know it and yet (ii) have been developed and tested assuming 
circumstances that rarely obtain in real-world wars (cf. Valentini 2016; Lazar and 
Valentini forthcoming). I shall return to this point in the next section. 
 The foregoing discussion has shown that the presence of idealizations in a 
normative theory raises interesting concerns only when the idealizations are found in 
the theory’s conditions of application. In that case, there might be a mismatch 
between the theory’s prescriptions and the domain for which they are intended (i.e., 
the real world). If so, those prescriptions are ill-suited to apply to existing 
circumstances. Otherwise, the presence of idealizations in the arguments offered in 
support of a theory is not per se problematic. And the presence of idealizations in the 
theory itself is problematic, but uninterestingly so: it simply means that the theory 
includes false propositions about its subject matter (be it international distributive 
justice, the just war or something altogether different).   
 
4. Responding to the Charge of Feasibility-Insensitivity 
A second set of challenges raised against ideal theories of international political 
morality concerns their insensitivity to feasibility constraints. Once again, several 
such theories exist. Here are some well-known examples. 
 
• Theories of global distributive justice, including the consequentialist view that 
one ought to give away all of one’s surplus resources to combat global poverty 
(Singer 1972), and the cosmopolitan egalitarian injunction to globalize 
Rawls’s difference principle (Beitz 1999; Pogge 1989). Both kinds of 
prescriptions appear to ignore feasibility constraints such as individuals’ lack 
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of selfless altruism, and the absence of powerful enough global institutions 
capable of realizing cosmopolitan global equality. 
• Theories of global democracy prescribing the democratization of global 
politics (e.g., Held 1995; Archibugi 2008; Marchetti 2008). These have been 
routinely accused of ignoring feasibility constraints, such as the lack of 
inclusive institutions at the global level, as well as the lack of a “global 
demos” (Miller 2010).   
• Revisionist theories of the just war that extend the ethics of self-defence to 
contexts of war. These are often criticized for failing to take into account the 
psychological, epistemic and institutional feasibility constraints that are 
typical of wars. As a result, so the critique goes, if implemented, their 
prescriptions would be counterproductive: leading to more wrongful killing 
than alternative, orthodox prescriptions (e.g., Buchanan 2006; Shue 2010; cf. 
McMahan 2008). 
  
Once again, whether the charge of feasibility-insensitivity is warranted or not depends 
on the particular theory we are looking at, and its specific aim. First, there is an entire 
class of theories for which feasibility constraints are immaterial, namely purely 
evaluative theories (Gilabert 2011). These theories do not aim to set out prescriptions 
and permissions, “oughts” and “mays.” Instead, they aim to develop standards of 
evaluation, allowing us to determine whether a given state of affairs is good or bad, 
just or unjust. Since such theories do not issue any “oughts,” they need not concern 
themselves with “cans”: namely with what is possible or feasible. A state of affairs 
can be bad, unfair or regrettable even if nobody is responsible for bringing it about, 
and nobody can remedy it. For example, a natural catastrophe without remedy can be 
bad, and perhaps even “unfair” or “unjust” if it hits a specific group of innocent 
individuals. So, to the extent that theories are meant to be exclusively evaluative—
hence not directly action-guiding—feasibility-insensitivity is not a concern (Gilabert 
2011; Gheaus 2013; Valentini 2016). And it may very well be that some demanding 
cosmopolitan theories requiring global equality, or global democracy, are best 
understood as purely evaluative in this sense. They tell us that there is something to 
be regretted in the fact that our world is unequal, and globally undemocratic, even if 
bringing about a democratic and egalitarian world is currently not in anyone’s power. 
In doing so, these purely evaluative theories may play an important critical function, 
by highlighting the existence of problematic power relations—even if they fail to 
provide a clear path to remedying them.3 
 But the retreat to pure evaluation is unlikely to satisfy critics, nor is it one that 
many international political theorists will want to undertake. For many, the whole 
point of theorizing about international political morality is to deliver prescriptions 
helping us orient ourselves in the real world. And when theories are prescriptive, as 
opposed to purely evaluative, feasibility constraints matter: “oughts” are valid only 
when it is possible/feasible for their addressees to act on them—or so I shall assume 
for present purposes. 
 There are two broad classes of feasibility-insensitivity for normative theories. 
First, there are theories whose prescriptions are genuinely impossible to realize. 
Second, there are theories whose prescriptions are unlikely to be acted upon. In what 
follows, I consider each in turn. 
                                                
3 I am grateful to the Editors of this Handbook for pointing this out to me.  
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 First, some theories may place demands on us that we simply cannot fulfil. 
Theories requiring global democracy or equality now might be of this kind. No matter 
how well-intentioned individuals or states might be, global equality or democracy are 
long-term goals that cannot be brought about today. Any theory demanding their 
immediate realization would thus problematically fall foul of the “ought implies can” 
constraint (cf. Meckled-Garcia 2008). That said, the most charitable reading of 
international political theories advocating global democracy or cosmopolitan equality 
is as evaluative theories, accompanied by ancillary prescriptions requiring existing 
agents to do what they “reasonably can” towards the achievement of these long-term 
goals. A commitment to global democracy or cosmopolitan equality may thus give 
rise to what Pablo Gilabert calls “dynamic duties,” namely duties to gradually bring 
about conditions under which the demands of global justice (or global democracy) 
can be realized (Gilabert 2012). These duties, however, would be constrained by 
feasibility considerations.  
 Second, we can turn to theories issuing prescriptions that can be fulfilled, but 
whose fulfilment is unlikely. Peter Singer’s (1972) demanding principle of global 
beneficence is a case in point. People are simply unlikely to be motivated to donate as 
big a portion of their earnings as Singer recommends. In fact, faced with Singer’s 
extreme requests, they are likely to ignore them. Similarly, it might be argued that 
revisionist just-war theory asks too much of those engaged in a war. The epistemic 
and psychological burdens it places on soldiers are so great that they are unlikely to 
be willing to carry them. Consequently, the institutionalization of revisionist just war 
theory risks being counter-productive: the relevant prescriptions and prohibitions are 
likely to be either ignored or misapplied (Shue 2010; McMahan 2008; Lazar and 
Valentini forthcoming).  
 What to say about this line of critique? Several responses can be given. Each 
of them shows that “feasibility-insensitivity” complaints directed at theories whose 
prescriptions are unlikely to be realized are not really about feasibility, but ultimately 
trace back to deeper moral controversies. In some cases, a prescription being unlikely 
to be realized is just a symptom of the prescription being overdemanding (Estlund 
2011, 222–23). For example, Singer’s “solution” to global poverty has come under 
attack precisely for this reason. Each individual, so the argument goes, should be 
allowed to give some priority to one’s own wellbeing and the wellbeing of one’s near 
and dear (Scheffler 1994). Yet Singer’s position on global justice ignores this morally 
salient fact. The “feasibility critique” here simply boils down to a substantive moral 
disagreement about the costs individuals may reasonably be asked to bear.4 Similar 
reflections can be advanced in the case of revisionist theorists of the just war: asking 
soldiers not to take up arms or not to defend themselves when in doubt about the 
justice of their cause may simply be too costly. 
 In other cases, a theory’s being unlikely to be realized is not a symptom of its 
overdemandingness, but just a by-product of people’s weakness of will or selfishness 
(Estlund 2014; Estlund 2011). In that case, the “feasibility” critique genuinely has no 
bite if the theory is meant to track “the morally right answer.” Yet the critique does 
have bite if the theory in question is meant to set out principles that should be 
efficacious when embodied in existing laws and institutions. For example, it may be 
                                                
4 Another critique of Singer’s view relates to its lack of sensitivity to the structural causes of poverty. A 
policy change, oriented towards greater individual or state donations, in the absence of deeper 
structural reforms of the global economy, may contribute to perpetuating the status quo or possibly 
have detrimental effects. See, e.g., Kuper (2002). This illustrates the general trade-off between policy 
and structural reforms we are likely face when trying to make the world more just.  
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that, in a fully just society, the tax rate on the richest segment of the population should 
be 70% (I use a similar example in Valentini 2016). Yet, under existing 
circumstances, one can foresee that such a tax rate would result in considerable tax 
evasion, tax avoidance, and people relocating to other countries with a more 
favourable tax regime (cf. Estlund 2011). This being so, a theory setting out 
prescriptions to be embedded into institutions and policies should indeed take account 
of likely compliance with them. This point is well understood by revisionist theorists 
of the just war, who are adamant about the fact that they are only setting out 
principles of the “deep” morality of war, rather than principles to be embedded in the 
“laws of war” (McMahan 2008; Lazar and Valentini forthcoming). The latter, 
revisionist theorists admit, ought to instead take account of likely compliance and 
other feasibility considerations.  
 In sum, whether the feasibility-insensitivity critique applies or undermines a 
given theory depends on the aim of that theory. If the theory is purely evaluative, 
feasibility constraints are irrelevant to its validity. If the theory is prescriptive or 
normative, such constraints matter. Prescriptions must satisfy the “ought implies can” 
proviso. Yet they need not satisfy an “ought implies likely” constraint, as David 
Estlund has already argued at length (Estlund 2011). Whether moral demands are 
likely to be realized or not may matter morally only when low likelihood is a sign of 
overdemandingness, or when principles are meant to offer policy or institutional 
prescriptions. Otherwise, the fact that the addressees of certain moral demands are 
unlikely to act on them simply signals their moral weakness. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have offered a moderate defence of ideal theory in international 
political theorizing. I have suggested that critiques pointing to theories’ use of 
idealizations and insensitivity to feasibility constraints succeed only in a limited 
number of cases. Global democrats, cosmopolitan egalitarians and revisionist just war 
theorists may be guilty of all sorts of mistakes in their theorizing, but the charge of 
“excessive idealism” is for the most part unlikely to suffice to invalidate their 
accounts. I have also, indirectly, shown that charges of excessive idealism are too 
indefinite to carry much significance. Instead of employing the catch-all expression 
“ideal theory,” it is better to level one’s charges against each position one disagrees 
with, pointing to the presence of idealizations where none should be, or to the 
prescriptions issued by the target theory being too demanding, impossible to realize or 
counterproductive when institutionalised. Without further explanation, a vague charge 
of “excessive idealism” carries very little, if any, weight.  
  
  
 10 
References 
Archibugi, Daniele. 2008. The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward 
Cosmopolitan Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Beitz, Charles R. 1999. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Buchanan, Allen. 2006. “Institutionalizing the Just War.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 
34 (1): 2–38. 
Caney, Simon. 2005. Justice beyond Borders. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Estlund, David. 2011. “Human Nature and the Limits (If Any) of Political 
Philosophy.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 39 (3): 207–37. 
———. 2014. “Utopophobia.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 42 (2): 113–34. 
Fabre, Cécile. 2012. Cosmopolitan War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Farrelly, Colin. 2007. “Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation.” Political Studies 55 
(4): 844–64. 
Frowe, Helen. 2014. Defensive Killing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gheaus, Anca. 2013. “The Feasibility Constraint on The Concept of Justice.” The 
Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252): 445–64. 
Gilabert, Pablo. 2011. “Feasibility and Socialism.” Journal of Political Philosophy 19 
(1): 52–63. 
———. 2012. From Global Poverty to Global Equality: A Philosophical Exploration. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gilabert, Pablo, and Holly Lawford-Smith. 2012. “Political Feasibility: A Conceptual 
Exploration.” Political Studies 60 (4): 809–25. 
Held, David. 1995. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to 
Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Kuper, Andrew. 2002. “More Than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the ‘Singer 
Solution.’” Ethics & International Affairs 16 (1): 107–28. 
Lawford-Smith, Holly. 2010. “Debate: Ideal Theory—A Reply to Valentini.” Journal 
of Political Philosophy 18 (3): 357–68. 
———. 2013. “Understanding Political Feasibility.” Journal of Political Philosophy 
21 (3): 243–59. 
Lazar, Seth, and Laura Valentini. forthcoming. “Proxy Battles in the Ethics of War: 
Jus in Bello, the Site of Justice, and Feasibility Constraints.” Oxford Studies in 
Political Philosophy III. 
List, Christian, and Laura Valentini. 2016. “The Methodology of Political Theory.” In 
Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, edited by Herman Cappelen, 
Tamar Gendler, and John Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Marchetti, Raffaele. 2008. Global Democracy: For and Against : Ethical Theory, 
Institutional Design, and Social Struggles. London: Routledge. 
McCarthy, Thomas. 2004. “Political Philosophy and Racial Injustice: From 
Normative to Critical Theory.” In Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment, edited by 
Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser, 147–68. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
McMahan, Jeff. 2008. “The Morality of War and the Law of War.” In Just and Unjust 
Warriors : The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers: The Moral and Legal 
Status of Soldiers, edited by David Rodin and Henry Shue, 19–43. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
———. 2009. Killing in War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Meckled-Garcia, Saladin. 2008. “On the Very Idea of Cosmopolitan Justice: 
Constructivism and International Agency.” Journal of Political Philosophy 16 
(3): 245–71. 
 11 
Miller, David. 2010. “Against Global Democracy.” In After the Nation: Critical 
Reflections on Post-Nationalism, edited by Kaith Breen and Shane O’Neill, 
141–60. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
———. 2013. Justice for Earthlings: Essays in Political Philosophy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Mills, Charles W. 2005. “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology.” Hypatia 20 (3): 165–83. 
O’Neill, Onora. 1996. Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of 
Practical Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pogge, Thomas. 1989. Realizing Rawls. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
———. 2001. “Rawls on International Justice.” The Philosophical Quarterly 51 
(203): 246–53. 
Räikkä, Juha. 1998. “The Feasibility Condition in Political Theory.” Journal of 
Political Philosophy 6 (1): 27–40. 
Rawls, John. 1999a. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. 1999b. The Law of Peoples: With “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Sangiovanni, Andrea. 2007. “Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State.” Philosophy 
& Public Affairs 35 (1): 3–39. 
Scheffler, Samuel. 1994. The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical 
Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Sen, Amartya. 2009. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Shue, Henry. 2002. “Rawls and the Outlaws.” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 1 
(3): 307–23. 
———. 2010. “Do We Need a ‘Morality of War’?” In Just and Unjust Warriors The 
Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers, edited by David Rodin and Henry Shue, 
87–111. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Simmons, A. John. 2010. “Ideal and Nonideal Theory.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 
38 (1): 5–36. 
Singer, Peter. 1972. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 1 (3): 229–43. 
Stemplowska, Zofia. 2008. “What’s Ideal About Ideal Theory?” Social Theory and 
Practice 34 (3): 319–40. 
Stemplowska, Zofia, and Adam Swift. 2012. “Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory.” In The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy, edited by David Estlund, 373–89. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Valentini, Laura. 2009. “On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory.” Journal of 
Political Philosophy 17 (3): 332–55. 
———. 2012. “Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map.” Philosophy 
Compass 7 (9): 654–64. 
———. 2016. “On the Messy Utopophobia vs Factophobia Controversy.” In Political 
Utopias, edited by Kevin Vallier and Michael Weber. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Walzer, Michael. 1977. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations. New York: Basic Books. 
Wiens, David. 2012. “Prescribing Institutions Without Ideal Theory.” Journal of 
Political Philosophy 20 (1): 45–70. 
———. 2015a. “Against Ideal Guidance.” The Journal of Politics 77 (2): 433–46. 
———. 2015b. “Political Ideals and the Feasibility Fronteer.” Economics & 
Philosophy 31 (3): 447–77. 
 12 
 
